EC[ON]OMY

The importance of exit strategy in industrial policy

Failures in industrial policy rarely look like failures at the moment decisions are made. Almost always, they start with good intentions. Protect jobs. Support a strategic sector. Speed up technological change. Save a national company. This is exactly how some of the most expensive and instructive policy mistakes of recent decades began.

The stories of Alitalia and the German solar industry are clear reminders that support without design turns into a trap, and state aid without an exit eventually starts working against the economy itself.

In recent years, governments have once again become active players in shaping industries. The green transition, digitalization, and geopolitical tension made this inevitable. But together with the return of industrial policy came an old risk.

Temporary support easily becomes permanent. Exceptions turn into norms. And policy gets captured by those it was meant to support only for a limited time.

Alitalia is often described as a case of poor management. In reality, it is a textbook example of policy design failure.

For decades, the airline lost competitiveness. Its market share shrank. Its finances deteriorated. Each time bankruptcy approached, the state stepped in. Directly or indirectly. Always under slogans of national interest and job protection.

Support was repeated again and again. The total cost reached billions of euros. The outcome was predictable. The company still went bankrupt, just much later and much more expensively.

The mistake was not state intervention itself. The mistake was the absence of exit conditions. Support was not tied to real changes in the business model. It did not push productivity growth. It froze the status quo. Political risks outweighed economic logic. Resources were spent preserving the past instead of building the future.

The German solar industry offers a different but equally instructive lesson. Germany was among the first to bet on green energy. Generous feed-in tariffs were introduced. Demand for solar panels surged. Producers got a guaranteed market. In a short time, Germany became a global leader. It looked like a textbook success.

But demand growth was not matched by protection and development of supply. Production chains were vulnerable. Chinese companies, backed by massive subsidies and scale effects, quickly took over the market. German manufacturers could not withstand the price pressure. Thousands of jobs disappeared.

In the end, German consumers effectively subsidized the growth of a foreign industry.

This case shows another side of industrial policy. Stimulating demand without synchronizing supply and protection leads to value leakage. Money stays in the economy, but value added moves abroad. The policy meets its formal goal but fails strategically.

Both stories share one core issue. No built-in safeguards.

Support was launched but not limited. Demand was created but not protected. Projects continued even when economic logic disappeared. Interest-group capture became inevitable.

This is the key lesson for Kazakhstan. The country is increasingly discussing industrial policy, and rightly so. The economy needs diversification. The green and digital transition requires investment. But without proper design, the same traps can emerge in an even more fragile form.

Kazakhstan does not have China’s scale or the shock-absorbing capacity of advanced economies. Mistakes are more costly here. Every failed program eats resources that could have gone elsewhere. That makes policy design a practical issue, not an academic one.

Any support must have a time limit. Not a symbolic one, but a real one. With clear exit criteria.

If an industry or company does not show gains in productivity, exports, or technological complexity, support must end automatically. Without political debates. Without manual extensions.

Globally, the absence of exit rules is what turns temporary aid into chronic dependence. Policy starts serving recipients instead of the economy. Kazakhstan needs to lock this principle in institutionally, not rhetorically.

Protection does not mean closing markets. It means fair competitive conditions.

The German case showed that stimulating demand without protecting supply leads to leakage. For Kazakhstan, this is especially relevant in an open economy. If the state creates demand through subsidies or procurement, it must also assess risks of dumping, technological displacement, and dependence on a single supplier.

Protection should act as a temporary shield while the industry builds scale and capability. Without it, industrial policy becomes financing someone else’s growth.

Policy cannot work if it is easy to capture by interest groups. This happens when criteria are vague, decisions are opaque, and responsibility is spread across agencies.

With its strong state and quasi-state sector, Kazakhstan is particularly exposed to this risk. Anti-capture must be built into the design itself. Public criteria. Open data on beneficiaries. Independent impact evaluation. Automatic shutdown mechanisms.

Support for innovation, industry, or the green transition cannot focus on one side only. Demand without supply creates imports. Supply without demand creates warehouses.

Policy must link the full chain, from skills and engineering to markets, from pilot projects to scaling. This was missing in the German solar case.

For Kazakhstan, this means designing programs end-to-end. Otherwise, the effect will be temporary.

Alitalia and many other failures show how dangerous it is to bet on a single player. When policy is tied to one company, flexibility is lost. Mistakes become extremely costly.

Competition must be built in from the start. Multiple projects. Multiple participants. Continuous selection.

This matters especially in Kazakhstan, where choosing a single executor is a common habit. In the short term, it cuts transaction costs. In the long term, it kills incentives to improve.

Another lesson is that industrial policy should not try to solve everything at once. Supporting industry, preserving jobs, balancing regions, and boosting growth simultaneously almost always ends in failure.

Each goal needs its own tools. Mixing them makes policy fragile.

For Kazakhstan, this means clear separation. Industrial policy is about growth and technology. Social policy is about jobs. Regional policy is about balance. When these blur, Alitalia appears.

In the end, industrial policy design is a test of institutional maturity. Not the ability to spend money, but the ability to stop support. Not the skill to protect individual players, but the ability to protect long-term efficiency.

The stories of Alitalia and German solar panels matter precisely because they happened in advanced economies with strong institutions. They show that mistakes are universal. And that safeguards must be built in from the start.

The lesson is not to abandon industrial policy. Quite the opposite.

Without clear design, protection, exit rules, and anti-capture mechanisms, any active policy quickly turns into a costly illusion of development. And that is exactly what Kazakhstan can afford least.

Lina Yegil kizi, expert of the EconomyKZ.org portal

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