EC[ON]OMY

Kazakhstan’s economic growth: why money alone Isn’t enough

For many years, Kazakhstan’s economic policy was guided by a simple idea: more investment, more credit, and more money should lead to faster economic growth. This logic feels intuitive and is often repeated in public debates. But real data shows that this model no longer works the way it once did. This contradiction is at the core of an economic study by the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan titled “Assessing the Impact of Finance on Economic Growth through Investment, Credit, and Money Supply.” The paper was prepared by Rustem Orazalin, Monetary Policy Department.

The main conclusion is clear and rather harsh: Kazakhstan’s slower growth is not caused by a lack of money. It is caused by falling productivity. Increasing financing volumes can no longer ensure sustainable economic acceleration.

The study begins with a long-term view of economic growth. Between 2000 and 2007, Kazakhstan’s economy grew by nearly 10% per year on average. After the global financial crisis, average growth dropped to about 4%. This decline proved persistent. Growth did not recover even during years of high commodity prices.

The key reason was the end of the commodity “supercycle” and a structural shift in the economy. In the 2000s, growth was supported by:

  • ⁠ ⁠inflows of foreign direct investment,
  • ⁠ ⁠rapid expansion of bank lending,
  • ⁠ ⁠growth in the money supply,
  • ⁠ ⁠access to cheap external borrowing for banks.

During that period, investment in fixed capital reached 31.9% of GDP, credit amounted to 56.5% of GDP, and monetization stood at 44% of GDP. However, this growth came with overheating, real estate bubbles, and clear signs of “Dutch disease.”

After 2008–2009, conditions changed fundamentally. External capital inflows declined. Foreign-currency lending became a major source of risk. The banking sector entered a long period of balance-sheet repair.

As a result:

  • ⁠ ⁠the investment-to-GDP ratio fell to 17–18%,
  • ⁠ ⁠investment growth slowed almost sixfold,
  • ⁠ ⁠credit shifted toward short-term financing of working capital.

Despite still having significant financial resources, the economy did not return to its previous growth rates. This raised the central question of the study: why does money no longer deliver the same results?

To answer this question, the author uses the Solow growth model, which breaks GDP growth into capital, labor, and total factor productivity (TFP). The results reveal an important paradox. The contribution of capital to growth has increased over time, yet overall economic growth has slowed. This means that each additional tenge of investment now produces less output than before. In other words, the economy faces diminishing returns to capital. Even the sharp rise in accumulated capital-over 17 trillion tenge by 2020-did not lead to faster growth.

The key finding of the study is that the main source of slowdown is declining productivity, not insufficient financing.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, productivity growth was driven by:

  • ⁠ ⁠market reforms,
  • ⁠ ⁠privatization,
  • ⁠ ⁠liberalization,
  • ⁠ ⁠reallocation of resources from inefficient sectors to more productive ones.

Later, this effect was partly replaced by the oil cycle, which artificially boosted demand in non-tradable sectors. Once the commodity cycle ended, productivity began to fall. As a result, much of the growth in the 2000s turned out to be quantitative rather than qualitative.

A separate section of the study focuses on the structure of bank lending. The findings are striking:

  • ⁠ ⁠about 74% of business loans go to working capital,
  • ⁠ ⁠only 5% finance fixed capital investment,
  • ⁠ ⁠credit is concentrated in trade, real estate, and services.

Non-oil tradable sectors-manufacturing and agriculture-receive only about 13% of total credit. This shows that the banking system does not act as a source of long-term growth. Instead, it mainly supports short-term activity in non-tradable sectors.

The study also highlights the growing role of the quasi-public sector. In recent years, its loan portfolio has reached 4.3 trillion tenge-about 60% of total corporate lending by banks.

Quasi-state entities crowd out market-based finance, distort competition, and create a growth model in which:

  • ⁠ ⁠large resource companies are financed outside the banking system,
  • ⁠ ⁠small and medium-sized businesses remain dependent on the budget,
  • ⁠ ⁠the private sector fails to become a driver of productivity.

Another important result concerns foreign direct investment. Despite large inflows, 65% of FDI goes into extractive industries. The share of reinvested profits is only 14.4%, well below levels seen in comparable countries.

This means that investment:

  • ⁠ ⁠contributes little to diversification,
  • ⁠ ⁠does not create strong technological spillovers,
  • ⁠ ⁠fails to generate long-term productivity growth.

The study leads to a fundamental conclusion: economic growth cannot be “bought” with money.

Rising investment, credit, and money supply can support the economy in the short term. But in the long run, productivity is the decisive factor. Productivity depends on the quality of institutions, competition, and private sector development. Without these conditions, further expansion of financial flows will only deepen distortions and reduce the efficiency of growth.

Alen Serik, expert of the  portal EconomyKZ.org

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