EC[ON]OMY

How demography shapes economic growth in Kazakhstan

Over just twenty years, developing countries added about 1.2 billion people. In the following twenty years, another 1.7 billion were added. This was the largest demographic shift in human history. It was not just a statistical change. It was a direct challenge for jobs, incomes, and social stability. If an economy cannot create jobs, population growth turns into poverty and tension. If it can, population growth becomes a source of development.

The experience of the second half of the twentieth century leads to one key conclusion. Rapid population growth did not destroy labor markets in developing countries. In many cases, economies adjusted. Labor was reallocated. Productivity increased. Income per capita rose. But this did not happen automatically. Outcomes depended on economic structure, the ability to accumulate capital, and how flexible labor markets were.

Between 1960 and 1980, the population of developing countries grew by around 1.2 billion people. This was more than the entire population of developed countries at that time. Between 1980 and 2000, population increased by another 1.7 billion. In other words, the population of the developing world almost doubled in half a century. Most of this growth occurred in low- and middle-income countries. These countries had high fertility for a long time, while mortality declined faster than economic change.

One important point must be clear. Population growth does not immediately mean labor force growth. There is always a time lag. When population grows because of high fertility, pressure on the labor market appears only after 15–25 years, when children reach working age. When growth comes from migration, the effect is immediate, because migrants are mostly working-age adults. In the period under review, population growth in developing countries was mainly driven by fertility. As a result, pressure on labor markets built up gradually, but reached very large levels.

In the 1970s, many countries began their demographic transition. Fertility rates started to fall. But labor force growth continued. This was the delayed effect of earlier population growth. Economies had to deal with a fast-growing labor supply and limited capacity to create productive jobs at the same time. This period became a real stress test for labor markets.

Labor supply depends not only on population size, but also on structure. Age composition, female participation, education, and migration all matter. In developing countries, male labor force participation is very high. Most working-age men are either employed or actively seeking work. The main differences come from women and young people.

Female labor force participation varies greatly across countries and regions. In some economies, it approaches levels seen in advanced countries. In others, it remains very low. These differences reflect cultural norms and economic structure more than income levels. In economies dominated by agriculture, much of women’s work is not captured in official statistics, even though women are actively involved in production. In urban economies, female participation depends on access to education, the structure of services, and social norms.

High fertility usually reduces female participation in the labor market. Childcare takes time. A decline in fertility can increase female participation, but this is not automatic. In some countries, participation of women aged 30–45 rose after fertility declined. In others, it fell. This shows that female labor participation is shaped not only by economics, but also by culture.

Education is another key factor. As education systems expand, young people stay in school longer and enter the labor market later. In the short term, this lowers participation rates. But it raises the quality of human capital. Over time, this helps economies adjust to population growth. This is why data show a consistent decline in youth labor participation as education expands.

As a result, labor force growth was often slower than population growth. This reduced pressure on labor markets, but increased the burden on those already working. In developing countries, the share of people aged 15–64 was lower than in advanced economies. The reason was a high share of children. This created a high dependency ratio.

A high dependency burden puts pressure on the economy in two ways. First, fewer workers must support more non-working people. This lowers average income and limits savings. Second, governments must devote large resources to schools, healthcare, and basic social infrastructure instead of productive investment. These expenditures are necessary, but they do not immediately raise productivity.

A defining feature of labor markets in developing countries is structural dualism. Economies are divided into at least two sectors. The first is the traditional sector, usually agriculture. The second is the modern sector, including industry and formal services. These sectors operate under different rules and deliver very different results.

In the traditional sector, work is mainly family-based or small-scale. Almost everyone who can work does work. But labor productivity is very low. The marginal contribution of an additional worker is close to zero. Adding workers does not increase output. Income is simply shared among more people. This creates disguised unemployment.

The modern sector works differently. It relies on wage employment. Production is more capital-intensive. Productivity is higher. Wages are higher. This sector is capable of generating sustained income growth.

The gap between these sectors shapes the development path. As long as there is surplus labor in the traditional sector, the modern sector can expand without raising wages. This supports profits and investment. But once surplus labor is absorbed, wages begin to rise. The economy enters a new phase of development.

Population growth affects this process directly. It increases the pool of surplus labor in the traditional sector and delays the moment when labor shortages appear. As a result, employment may grow while living standards improve slowly. This is why rising employment does not always mean rising welfare.

Migration plays a special role in labor market adjustment. Income gaps between rural and urban areas encourage people to move. But the modern sector cannot always absorb all migrants. As a result, the urban informal sector grows. This is not classic unemployment. People work, but often in unstable and low-productivity jobs.

The informal sector performs an important adjustment function. It allows migrants to survive in cities, acquire skills, and adapt to urban life. It reduces social tension. Urban living is also usually associated with lower fertility. This slows future population growth and reduces long-term pressure on labor markets.

Government policy can either support or distort these processes. In many developing countries, the state is a major employer. In some cases, public employment accounts for a much larger share of non-agricultural jobs than in advanced countries at similar stages of development. Public sector wages often exceed average income per capita. This creates strong distortions. Workers seek stable and well-paid government jobs instead of moving into productive private sectors.

Minimum wages also affect labor markets. In most developing countries, they are set and typically equal to about 30–50 percent of manufacturing wages. But enforcement is uneven. Minimum wages mainly apply to large formal firms and rarely affect the informal sector. This deepens labor market segmentation.

Despite these constraints, the data show a clear and important trend. Between 1960 and 1980, the share of employment in agriculture declined in all groups of developing countries. Employment growth shifted toward services and industry. Even in countries with the fastest population growth, labor gradually moved out of the lowest-productivity sector.

This transition was uneven. It progressed faster in middle-income countries and more slowly in low-income ones. But the direction was the same everywhere. Agriculture remained the largest employer, but its share fell. Services usually expanded faster than industry.

Labor reallocation had a direct impact on productivity. In all country groups, productivity in agriculture was below the economy-wide average. Productivity in industry and services was higher. When a worker moved from agriculture into industry or services, average productivity rose even without technological change. This effect was large.

Estimates show that labor reallocation accounted for between 14 and 25 percent of total productivity growth in developing countries over twenty years. In middle-income countries, the contribution reached about one-quarter of total growth. In low-income countries, it was around one-seventh. Given the scale of population growth, this was a major achievement.

But productivity growth did not come only from reallocation. Productivity also increased within sectors. In all sectors, output grew faster than employment. This shows that economies were not only shifting labor. They were becoming more efficient.

Agricultural productivity grew more slowly than in other sectors. In low-income countries, agricultural output grew by about 56 percent, while agricultural employment increased by about 35 percent. This implies productivity growth of roughly one-fifth. In industry and services, productivity growth was several times higher. In middle-income countries, agricultural productivity grew by about 75 percent, close to the levels seen in advanced economies during the same period.

This result is critical. It shows that even with rapid population growth, agriculture did not stagnate completely. Productivity improved. This may reflect technological change, better organization, or stronger incentives as surplus labor declined.

Middle-income countries achieved the strongest outcomes. They had lower fertility, a higher share of working-age population, faster expansion of education, and higher investment in physical and human capital. Labor force growth was more manageable. Structural change progressed faster.

Low-income countries faced tighter constraints. Fertility remained high. Capital was scarce. Institutions were weaker. Demographic pressure remained a serious challenge. Yet even in these countries, there was no general collapse in income per capita and no complete breakdown of labor markets.

This historical experience matters for countries on similar development paths today. This includes Kazakhstan. By income level and economic structure, Kazakhstan is closer to the group of middle-income countries. This means the same adjustment mechanisms are relevant.

For Kazakhstan, the key issue is not population size itself, but the structure of employment. Experience shows that sustainable growth depends on moving labor from low-productivity activities into more productive sectors. This applies not only to agriculture, but also to low-productivity services. Without productivity growth within sectors, demography becomes a source of pressure.

Another important lesson concerns education. Delayed entry of young people into the labor market is not a problem by itself. It improves labor quality. But the economy must be able to offer jobs that match these skills. Otherwise, mismatches and frustration grow.

Experience also highlights the role of government policy. Large gaps between formal and informal sectors, an overly attractive public sector, and rigid labor markets slow structural change. At the same time, the expansion of services and gradual easing of demographic pressure create opportunities for sustained growth.

The core conclusion remains unchanged. Population growth is not a sentence. But it is not an automatic benefit either. It becomes a driver of growth only when the economy can accumulate capital, raise productivity, and move labor into more efficient sectors. Without this capacity, demography turns into risk. For Kazakhstan, this is not an abstract choice. It is a long-term structural decision.

Aidar Kakimzhanov, independent expert, specifically for www.economyKZ.org

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