EC[ON]OMY

Reforming Kazakhstan’s quasi-public sector for growth

Kazakhstan remains an economy with a high state presence. Companies with government ownership operate in at least two-thirds of all sectors. This limits competition, distorts incentives, and makes the economy more complex. A corporate governance review by the OECD highlights the core problem: the state acts both as regulator and as owner. This model creates conflicts of interest, reduces efficiency, and blurs accountability. Governance of the quasi-public sector is no longer a technical issue. It has become a systemic one, closely linked to fiscal stability, investment confidence, and long-term growth.

For many years, a large state role in the economy was seen as a source of stability. State assets helped preserve jobs, control infrastructure, and deliver strategic goals. But as the economy grew more complex, this model began to work against itself.

According to the OECD, state-owned or state-linked enterprises operate in at least 20 out of 30 sectors in Kazakhstan. This means the state is active not only in strategic and infrastructure areas, but also in sectors where markets could function on their own. In such conditions, private businesses face unequal competition. State companies have access to budget funding, administrative support, and regulatory advantages. This weakens incentives to invest and innovate.

The problem is made worse by fragmentation. The quasi-public sector includes state enterprises, limited liability and joint-stock companies with state ownership, the national wealth fund, national holdings and companies, their subsidiaries, social funds, and special institutions. Formally, they report to different authorities. In reality, they operate in one economic space without common rules.

Quasi-public entities can be divided into four broad groups. First, companies under the Samruk-Kazyna fund. Second, entities within the Baiterek national holding. Third, organizations subordinated to central government bodies. Fourth, social-entrepreneurial corporations and structures managed by local authorities. Each group follows its own management logic. Goals differ. Reporting lines differ. There is no single system to assess performance. As a result, functions overlap and responsibility is spread thin.

Samruk-Kazyna is the largest asset owner in Kazakhstan’s economy. According to public data, group revenues exceeded KZT 17 trillion in 2024. This makes the fund a dominant economic player. But size does not replace clarity. Inside the group, strategic, commercial, and social assets coexist. Yet they are often managed under similar rules, despite having very different purposes.

Strategic assets are meant to protect long-term national interests. These include infrastructure, core industries, and system-critical companies. They require stability, transparency, and performance indicators comparable to the private sector. The state should act as an active owner, but stay out of day-to-day operations.

Commercial assets are, by nature, temporary. Their role is to fix market failures or help launch new markets. They should not remain in state ownership forever. The goal should be a gradual exit and the creation of real competition.

Social assets should not pursue profit. They should not pay bonuses tied to financial results. Their purpose is to deliver public value.

Without this clear separation, cross-subsidization emerges. Incentives become distorted. Infrastructure assets turn into hidden support tools for other sectors.

Baiterek was created as a development institution. Its main role was to deliver state support policies. Over time, however, it became an asset owner. By the end of 2023, the group’s obligations exceeded KZT 10.9 trillion. More than half of this debt is backed by state funding. This means fiscal risks are largely borne by the budget. The key issue is that Baiterek both manages support programs and competes in the market as an owner. This distorts competition and complicates any unified strategy for managing state property. Development and ownership roles are mixed.

International practice offers a different approach. Development institutions support markets but do not act as market players. For Kazakhstan, this means removing asset ownership from Baiterek and leaving it with a clear policy implementation role.

One of the OECD’s main recommendations is a strict separation between ownership and regulation. When the state regulates a sector and owns companies in that same sector, conflicts of interest are inevitable. Regulatory decisions stop being neutral. They begin to reflect ownership interests. Ministries should focus on policy and oversight. Asset management should be left to a professional owner. Without this separation, reforms will be seen as administrative interventions rather than market-based changes.

Creating a single center for managing state assets is a core reform step. This body should develop standards, methods, and rules. It should classify assets by function and decide whether they should stay in state hands or move to the private sector. This would shift the system away from departmental logic toward economic logic. Assets would be judged by what they do, not by which agency controls them.

Organizations that provide services to citizens are overloaded with non-core tasks. Schools, hospitals, and similar institutions handle HR, accounting, legal support, and audits on their own. These functions are duplicated at many levels. Moving support functions to the shareholder level and removing corporate governance elements would cut costs and allow institutions to focus on their main mission: service delivery.

Entities that provide services to businesses have turned regulatory functions into revenue streams. Prices often exceed actual costs. Parliamentary oversight over these revenues is limited. Converting such entities into non-profit organizations, and directing all income to the state budget, would ease pressure on businesses and remove incentives to inflate fees.

Infrastructure operators should move from ordering construction to ordering services. This opens the door to real public-private partnerships, risk sharing, and better quality. Infrastructure should be treated as a long-term development asset, not as a hidden subsidy tool.

Each year, the state spends more than KZT 150 billion on intangible assets. This includes software, research, films, and methodologies. Most of these outputs are never reused. Without a life-cycle approach, the budget loses money and potential value is wasted. International practice focuses on reuse and monetization. Shared ownership models can reduce costs and improve returns on public investment.

Efficient management of state assets is not about ideology. It is about fiscal sustainability, fair competition, and institutional trust. Clear role separation, asset classification, and an end to hidden administrative control can change the role of the quasi-public sector. From a drag on growth, it can become a development tool.

Aziza Kasenova, independent expert, specifically for www.economyKZ.org

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