EC[ON]OMY

Kazakhstan’s education system: the conflict of interest dilemma

Kazakhstan’s education system has run into a clear contradiction. On one hand, the President signs a decree on economic liberalization. The document clearly supports the Yellow Pages Rules principle: the state should step back from sectors where private business already operates and remove artificial advantages for state-owned or quasi-state players. The Agency for Protection and Development of Competition followed this line and adopted a roadmap to actively develop private schools.

On the other hand, in 2026 the профиль ministry has effectively started limiting the role of private schools in the mass segment. Instead of stronger competition, we are seeing an administrative U-turn. A moratorium has been introduced on state funding for new schools. There is also discussion about lowering the cap on parental fees from 1200 to 250 monthly calculation indices. In practice, this makes it almost impossible to build a strong alternative to overcrowded public schools.

Why is this happening? It is not about “saving the budget.” It is about a classic conflict of interest.

The “Playing coach” trap

In public administration theory, two roles are usually separated:

  • ⁠ ⁠Provision – the state guarantees access to education and allocates taxpayer money
  • ⁠ ⁠Production – the actual delivery of the service, whether by a public school, a private school, or an independent institution

When the same body both funds and produces the service, efficiency tends to fall. Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom showed that when the buyer becomes a monopoly producer, the system starts protecting itself from competition. In economics, this is often called regulatory capture. But here the situation is even more specific. It looks like state-level self-dealing.

The ministry:

  • ⁠ ⁠writes the rules
  • ⁠ ⁠distributes the budget
  • ⁠ ⁠manages public schools

So when parents move their children to private schools, it may not be seen as success in access policy. It may be seen as a threat to the ministry’s own infrastructure. The natural reaction of a monopoly is to create barriers to entry.

How the restrictions work

Recent decisions fit this logic of protecting institutional assets. Take the proposal to lower the parental fee cap to 250 indices. With the current level of state funding, the total per-student budget would be around 1.8 million tenge per year. The economic outcome is predictable.

If the budget falls below a certain level:

  • ⁠ ⁠teacher salaries shrink
  • ⁠ ⁠qualified staff leave
  • ⁠ ⁠education quality declines

Private schools are then forced to choose:

1.⁠ ⁠lower their standards to match overcrowded public schools

2.⁠ ⁠move into the premium segment and serve only wealthy families

The real losers are not rich families. They can always pay full price. The middle class loses access to quality education through co-financing mechanisms. At the same time, the moratorium on state funding for new schools sends a clear signal to investors: demand guarantees are uncertain. That blocks investment in the sector.

Is there an alternative?

Yes. Other countries show different models can work.

The Netherlands. More than 70 percent of schools are privately run but publicly funded. The constitution guarantees financial equality. Private schools receive the same per-student funding as public schools and do not charge mandatory fees for the core program. The state funds education but does not try to monopolize production.

South Korea. The government provides vouchers for after-school programs. It openly accepts that one institution may not cover all a child’s needs.

Arizona, United States. Education Savings Accounts allow parents to allocate funds across different providers, including online courses and tutors.

These examples show that funding education does not require the state to directly control every school.

The Institutional contradiction

When the regulator also manages the network of schools, a conflict of interest is built into the system. Chile’s 2015 reforms are a warning. Strict limits on co-financing and profit reduced private supply and increased pressure on the budget, without solving deeper quality problems. As long as the regulator manages schools directly, decisions will be shaped by internal incentives.

A possible solution:

  • ⁠ ⁠the ministry focuses on standards and quality control
  • ⁠ ⁠asset management is separated from regulatory functions
  • ⁠ ⁠funding follows the student under clear and equal rules

Only by removing the structural conflict can competition work in the interest of families and students.

Vadim Novikov, Assistant Professor, specifically for www.economyKZ.org

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