Industrialization is back on the agenda. The state launches programs, discusses new plants, talks about value added and exports. But there is one persistent blind spot in this picture. People. Not people in general, but engineers, technologists, designers, production managers. Those who turn investment into working factories. Without them, industrialization stops at the level of polished concepts. That is exactly what is happening in Kazakhstan today.
The main trend of recent years is obvious. Industrial policy is accelerating faster than human capital is being built to support it. Projects appear quicker than the specialists who are supposed to run them. The result is a paradox. Money is available. Sites exist. Equipment is purchased. But stable production results do not materialize. The reason is not a lack of intent. It is a lack of people.
The experience of countries that successfully passed through rapid industrialization shows a hard rule. Industrial growth does not start with machines. It starts with the mass accumulation of engineering and technological skills. Not selectively. Not for a few flagship projects. But systemically. When a critical mass of specialists creates an environment where production can become more complex without constant external support.
In successful models, investment in education and skills began long before industry moved to higher complexity. Governments invested in schools, technical universities, engineering programs. They did so deliberately. Not abstractly. Linked to specific sectors and future production tasks. The growth in the number of engineers ran in parallel with industrial expansion. Not with a delay. And not ahead of demand without absorption capacity.
Kazakhstan has long moved in the opposite direction. First, sectoral priorities were announced. Then plants were launched. Only afterward did the search for skills begin. In the best case through retraining. In the worst case through importing specialists. This model can work in isolated cases. But it does not create a sustainable base. It does not build a national school. It does not reduce dependence on external knowledge.
This is especially visible in projects that require more than assembly. Any modern production lives off continuous engineering decisions. Decisions about quality, cost, logistics, adaptation to markets. Without a strong engineering team, a plant becomes a site with a limited lifespan. It works while support exists. Then competitiveness erodes.
In countries that managed to build industrial ecosystems, engineers became a mass profession. Not elite. Not rare. But widespread. This changed the structure of the economy itself. New directions could be launched quickly. Flexibility increased. Internal competition of ideas emerged. Production stopped being static.
Kazakhstan is still in a different position. Engineering skills remain scarce. Not only quantitatively, but qualitatively. Many specialists lack experience in complex production chains. This is not their fault. It is a result of the economic structure. When industry does not grow in complexity for a long time, engineering capabilities do not accumulate.
The state tries to close this gap through individual initiatives. But they are often weakly connected to industrial policy. Education programs follow their own logic. Industrial projects follow another. The link between them is thin. As a result, graduates do not always find relevant jobs. And companies cannot find the specialists they need.
In successful models, the link between education and industry was tight. Not formal. The state clearly understood which skills would be needed in five or ten years and began training people in advance. Not only at universities. Practical programs played a major role. Internships. On-the-job training. Learning through real production processes.
Special attention was given to overseas education. Not as a status symbol, but as a knowledge transfer tool. Thousands of students studied abroad and then returned to work in national industry. This created accelerated capability accumulation. Crucially, return was embedded in the system. It was not left to individual choice.
Kazakhstan also invests in overseas education. But the impact is often diluted. Graduates move into other sectors. Or leave. Or never enter industry. The reason is simple. There is no institutional link between education spending and industrial demand. Demand exists, but it is not formalized.
Scale is another critical issue. Industrialization requires mass. A few hundred engineers do not change the system. Thousands are needed. And they must work not only in large corporations, but in mid-sized firms, supplier chains, and service companies. This creates knowledge density. Without it, industry remains fragmented.
In Kazakhstan, the density of engineering knowledge remains low. This limits the economy’s ability to move up the value chain. Even with investment and infrastructure, new projects face the same problems. Lack of local suppliers. Dependence on imported solutions. Slow adaptation.
Engineers matter not only for factories. They matter for the state itself. Effective industrial policy requires a competent client. Decision-makers must understand technological logic. Otherwise, they cannot properly assess projects. They miss risks. They fail to distinguish realistic plans from presentations.
In successful industrial countries, many policymakers had engineering backgrounds or worked closely with technical teams. This reduced the gap between strategy and execution. In Kazakhstan, this gap is often too wide. Industrial policy is designed in one world and implemented in another. They lack a shared language.
Human capital is also central to exports. Accessing foreign markets requires more than price. It requires quality, certification, product adaptation. These are engineering tasks. Without them, exports remain episodic. They do not become sustainable.
Today, Kazakhstan talks a lot about economic complexity. But complexity cannot grow without more complex skills. This is a basic link. It cannot be bypassed. It cannot be replaced by money. It cannot be compensated with incentives. It can only be built.
This is not about copying foreign models. It is about principle. Industrial policy without human capital becomes a set of infrastructure projects. They can be useful. But they do not create long-term dynamics. They do not form domestic competence centers.
For Kazakhstan, the core challenge is to stop treating education and industry as separate worlds. They must operate as a single system. Engineering training must be aligned with concrete sectors, concrete technological chains, concrete export niches.
This requires a shift in priorities. Investing in equipment without investing in people delivers short-term effects. Investing in people without industrial demand leads to brain drain. Balance exists only through a hard linkage between the two.
Human capital is often called a long-term investment. That is true. Which is exactly why it cannot be postponed. Every delay widens the gap. Kazakhstan is already facing a situation where projects outpace skills. This gap will only grow.
Industrialization always starts with people. Not with programs. Not with factories. Not with reports. Until this simple idea becomes central to industrial policy, all other elements will work intermittently. And every new industrial cycle will run into the same question.
Who is going to do the work?
Ruslan Sultanov, economist, President of the “PharmMedIndustry Kazakhstan” Association, specifically for www.economyKZ.org
